Panamanian-American relations 3.pan.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[107]

In discussing the American memorandum of October 2, 1941 to Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister Toyoda explained that the Japanese government had expressed considerable difficulty in grasping its main points. However, Japan decided that the existing problem included the garrisoning of Japanese troops in China; the English, Japanese, and American attitude toward the European war; and finally commercial discrimination in China.

If the United States had any misgivings concerning Japan's attitude towards these three points, Foreign Minister Toyoda was anxious to answer any questions. Although Foreign Minister Toyoda desired to draw up a treaty covering those three points for adoption of both countries, he believed that the question of time excluded the possibility of exchanging further official notes and documents. At this point in the negotiations, only a conference between the leaders of both governments could effect a suitable solution.

When Ambassador Grew remarked that American public opinion must be considered carefully, Foreign Minister Toyoda replied that Japanese public opinion was an equally important factor. However, once the proposed leaders' conference was convened, the present tension of the Japanese people would be greatly relieved.

Foreign Minister Toyoda could not speak about further Japanese aggression in French Indo-China at this conference, because, as yet, the Japanese army had made no reply to the Foreign Office in regard to Ambassador Grew's statement concerning that move.[469]

It will be noted that Foreign Minister Toyoda did not inform Ambassador Nomura of the fact that he had discussed with Ambassador Grew the sending of another Japanese diplomat with the personal rank of Ambassador to assist the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

119. Tokyo Sends Instructions for Welles-Wakasugi Conference

On October 11, 1941 Minister Wakasugi advised his government that he would confer with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles at 5:00 P.M. on October 13, 1941.[470] Therefore, on October 13, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Office issued instructions to Minister Wakasugi governing his forthcoming conversation with Mr. Welles.[471]

Pointing out that the situation in Japan was approaching a crisis and any adjustments of Japanese-American relations would have to be accomplished immediately, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that Minister Wakasugi's conversation with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles cover all the Japanese-American negotiations to date. First of all, however, the Japanese representative must determine if the United States disagreed with Japan on any other points except the three then under consideration. Japan was particularly interested in the exact demands of the United States in the proposal submitted on June 21, 1941. However, if the United States government refused to deliver a clear-cut counter-proposal, Japan desired that America draw up an entirely new tentative agreement without delay.[472]

Since circumstances would not permit even a moment's delay in the present negotiations, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Minister Wakasugi to submit a rough outline of his conversation with Mr. Welles immediately after it had taken place, and later to give more complete details by cable.[473]

[469] Ibid.
[470] III, 263.
[471] III, 264-265.
[472] Ibid.
[473] III, 266.

[108]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

120. Welles-Wakasugi Conversation (October 13, 1941)

(a) Under Secretary Welles' Report[474]

Since he had recently returned from an official visit to Japan, Mr. Wakasugi, the Minister-Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, called on Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles on October 13, 1941 to convey his personal impressions concerning Japan's internal situation. During his stay at Tokyo, Mr. Wakasugi had interviews with Prince Takamatsu, the brother and closest adviser of the Emperor; Prince Higashi Kuni; Prince Konoye; Marquis Kido, another close adviser of the Emperor; Foreign Minister Toyoda and high ranking army and navy officials.

Mentioning that there existed among this group a unanimous desire for a Japanese-American rapprochement, Mr. Wakasugi noted that the pro-Axis elements had become powerful, particularly among the younger members of Japan's armed forces. Therefore, although the policies of the Japanese government were supported by the controlling factions in the army and navy and by public opinion, unless the present conversations with the United States culminated in definite action, German propaganda agents at work in Japan would gain in power. Moreover, if the present Japanese Cabinet were to fall, as a result of a coup d'etat, because of assassination or because it could see no hope of reaching an agreement with the United States, it would be replaced by military representatives, responsive solely to German pressure, and hopes for a Japanese-American settlement would vanish.

In order to reach a Japanese-American understanding without delay, Prince Konoye had suggested a meeting with President Roosevelt. The failure of the United States to take a definite stand in the matter had prevented the Japanese government from finding out what in reality were the desires of the United States in regard to an agreement.

Refuting Mr. Wakasugi's last statement, Mr. Welles insisted that, not only throughout innumerable conversations, but more specifically in the documents of June 21, 1941 and October 2, 1941, the United States had clearly established its position. Moreover, in the opinion of the American government, it was the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941 which had raised an obstacle to a liberal agreement by the very principles upon which the rapprochement was to have been based. Furthermore, Mr. Welles reminded the Japanese Minister that Tokyo had undertaken military action in French Indo-China and to the north of the Empire, which seemed to belie the main purpose for which the reaching of an agreement was being sought.

Mr. Wakasugi revealed that Axis agents in Japan were spreading the rumor that America was delaying negotiations because it had no desire to reach any agreement with Tokyo. According to Under Secretary Welles, there were some in the United States who were attributing the same policy to Japan.

In answering Mr. Welles' criticism of the Japanese aggression in French Indo-China, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the action taken was analogous to the occupation of Iceland by the United States. Continuing his explanation, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had been undertaken through an agreement with a government dominated by Germany, while the American occupation of Iceland had been effected through an agreement with Denmark, a country also dominated by Germany.

In order to rectify the Japanese Minister's erroneous conception of the United States' action in Iceland, Mr. Welles asserted that the United States had not dealt through Denmark, but directly with the free government of Iceland. Furthermore, the United States had been motivated by a justifiable fear of the dangerous results German occupation of that territory would have on American defense. On the other hand, French Indo-China had presented no threat to Tokyo.

[474] "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)", October 13, 1941, S.D., II, 680-686.

[109]

Returning to the discussion of the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the misunderstanding of certain terms in these proposals had arisen largely through the use of unfortunate phraseology. In attempting to clarify these terms the Japanese Minister said that Japan would commit itself to undertake no aggressive moves, either north or south of the Empire. However, if the Stalin government were to collapse and some other foreign power were to take over eastern Siberia, Japan would be forced to defend its own interests and those of Manchukuo. Furthermore, in regard to the policy of commercial nondiscrimination, Japan had every intention of applying that principle to China and the entire Pacific area.

Referring to the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Wakasugi asked that the United States agree to leave the interpretation of Japan's obligations to the discretion of Tokyo. Although admitting that any new Cabinet might decide on a different interpretation, at the same time Mr. Wakasugi insisted that only the present Japanese Cabinet would desire to maintain peace with the United States in the event that the United States entered the war against Germany. Mr. Welles promised to refer this question to Secretary Hull.

Through insisting that evacuation of Japanese troops in China could not be completed in a day, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the Japanese government was willing eventually to evacuate all its troops from the China area. Thinking that he misunderstood this statement, Mr. Welles asked Mr. Wakasugi to repeat his remarks. The Japanese representative again said that his country was willing to evacuate its troops from China.

The Japanese Minister then asked if the American government would insist on approving the peace terms proposed by Japan before they were submitted to China. Mr. Welles replied that in the event the United States agreed to mediate between Japan and China, he would not undertake the transmission of peace terms to the Chungking government unless such terms were just and conducive to the maintenance of a stable peace in the Pacific.

In answer to another question from Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Welles stated that it would not be possible to reach a basis for an understanding on the other major principles without settling the China Incident.

Emphasizing once more the desire of the Japanese government and controlling officials of both the Japanese army and navy to conclude and implement a comprehensive agreement with the United States, Mr. Wakasugi felt that within twenty-four or forty-eight hours, Japan would reach a final decision on the basic questions involved.[475]

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

In accordance with the instructions from Tokyo, a general summarization of the Welles-Wasasugi conversation held on October 13, 1941 was submitted immediately after the interview had taken place. It stated that the conversation had lasted more than two hours with the general tone remaining friendly and frank throughout. Since both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull still desired the materialization of the proposed meeting between the leaders of the two governments, Under Secretary Welles informed Mr. Wakasugi that if the three major issues were settled, no further obstacles would stand in the way of the meeting.

Though Mr. Wakasugi had received the impression that Secretary Hull believed that one or two points would need clarification when preliminary arrangements were brought up-to-date, Mr. Welles, uncertain of the nature of these points, promised to obtain more information concerning them for the Japanese representative.

[475] Ibid.

[110]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

After first assuring the American Under Secretary of State that his questions of the matter were purely personal and not influenced by either the Japanese government or Ambassador Nomura, Mr. Wakasugi stated that he felt the United States' attitude had been made clear in the proposals of June 21, 1941 and the oral statement of October 2, 1941. However, he wished to point out the difficulty, from a practical standpoint, of evacuating Japanese troops who had been stationed in China for a long period of years. Even if once determined upon, the execution of such a program would require months and even years. Moreover, since the removal of Japanese forces primarily concerned Japan and China, Mr. Wakasugi asked if the United States would be willing to leave the details of this removal to an agreement drawn up between Japan and China.

If Japan were sincere, Mr. Welles felt that the troop evacuation could be accomplished by such an agreement. At the same time, however, the United States had no intention of making further counter-proposals to the Japanese government since the American documents of June 21, 1941 and October 2, 1941 were the result of thorough and careful consideration and embodied all America's objectives. Nevertheless, Mr. Welles seemed confident that if the objectives contained in the American proposals were not changed, the United States would be willing to alter the phraseology of the proposals.

From the conversation, Mr. Wakasugi received the impression that the United States based its disapproval of the Japanese proposals of both September 6 and September 25, 1941 on the fact that they restricted considerably the terms decided upon in preliminary conversations.[476]

In a later message which gave a more complete account of his conversation with Under-Secretary of State Welles, Mr. Wakasugi reported that the main stumbling block in Japanese-American negotiations lay in the fact that the United States' main interest was in an agreement upon basic principles, whereas Japan desired, first of all, to clarify outstanding differences and then discuss basic generalities.[477] Mr. Wakasugi pointed out that before the basic principles could be carried out to any satisfactory degree, they must be applicable to actual circumstance, otherwise they remained meaningless. But Under Secretary of State Welles stated that if basic principles were decided upon, they could be applied later to actual problems and individual agreements.

In requesting that the United States exhibit great statesmanship by overlooking these differences and concluding a peace desired by both countries, Mr. Wakasugi pointed out that in spite of the practically unanimous desire of the Japanese people for a northward or southward move, the Japanese government had been willing to lose public support in order to adjust relations with the United States.

While appreciating the efforts of the Japanese government and encouraged by the statesmanship exhibited, the United States was nevertheless disturbed by Japan's occupation of French Indo-China after the United States had submitted its proposals for peace on June 21, 1941. By way of explanation, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the occupation of French Indo-China, which had a direct bearing on the China Incident, was carried out with the full agreement of the French government because of Japan's need for security.[478]

121. Secret Arrangements Are Made for Terasaki-Wakasugi Telephone Conversation

In order that more complete information of this Welles-Waskasugi conversation might be forwarded without delay to the Japanese government, secret arrangements were made by

[476] III, 267.
[477] III, 268-269.
[478] Ibid.

[111]

Tokyo on October 13, 1941 for a telephone conversation to take place on October 13, 1941 between Mr. Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau in the Foreign Office at Tokyo, and Mr. Wakasugi.[479] A secret code in the guise of innocuous phrases was to be used to reveal the attitude of the United States and the general outlook of the current negotiations.[480]

122. Ambassador Nomura Confers with Rear Admiral Turner (October 14, 1941)

At an interview with Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner on October 14, 1941, Ambassador Nomura received a more complete picture of the American attitude toward a conference between the leaders of the two governments.[481] Although aware of the various internal difficulties which Japan was facing, Admiral Turner asserted that the United States needed a definite promise from the Japanese government, or at least some definite preliminary agreement settling the major differences, before a conference could be held between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye. If such an understanding were not reached prior to this leaders' conference and, in the meantime, Japan advanced into Siberia, President Roosevelt would be placed in a difficult position.

Since Japan's statements indicated that it could decide matters pertaining to peace in the Pacific independently of any other nation, it seemed logical to Admiral Turner that the Japanese government could put aside its obligations under the Tripartite Pact in order to reach an understanding with the United States. Moreover, since it was impossible to withdraw troops all at once, a treaty could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory.[482]

123. American Sources Reveal Possibility of Early Russo-German Peace

During the same conversation with Admiral Turner on October 14, 1941 Ambassador Nomura learned of rumors rife in America concerning the possibility of an early peace between Russia and Germany.[483] Expressing a viewpoint which Ambassador Nomura believed was held by the United States Navy, Admiral Turner said that if Germany should offer Great Britain peace terms at the termination of the Russo-German war, Britain would refuse to accept them.

On the other hand, other American sources revealed different attitudes on this point. In the opinion of Mr. Herbert Hoover, London would quite possibly accept a generous peace agreement offered by Germany in the event that Russia made a separate peace. Since the belief that the European war might soon be terminated was held principally by American isolationists, Ambassador Nomura did not believe that it would have too great an effect on the Japanese-American negotiations.

Mr. Frederick Moore, the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, disclosed that in a conversation with Senator Thomas, Secretary Hull had stated that he hoped the Japanese government would not mistake American patience for weakness. A Washington newspaper correspondent thought that although the cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany seemed probable, the odds for war between Japan and the United States were still even.[484]

[479] III, 270.
[480] Ibid.
[481] III, 271.
[482] Ibid.
[483] III, 272.
[484] Ibid.

[112]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

124. Ambassador Grew Is Informed of German Pressure (October 15, 1941)

During a private lunch with Mr. Amau, the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, on October 15, 1941, Ambassador Grew learned that Germany was urging Japan to issue a statement confirming former Foreign Minister Matsuoka's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, whereby Japan would declare war against the United States should war occur between Germany and the United States.[485] Though no reply had been sent to Berlin, Tokyo was contemplating a declaration stating that the maintenance of peace in the Pacific had been envisioned in the Tripartite Pact, and with this in mind, Japanese obligations under this pact had been brought to the attention of the United States.

125. Rear Admiral Turner Confers with Mr. Terasaki (October 15, 1941)

Rear Admiral Turner, a trusted friend of Admiral Stark, invited Mr. Terasaki to his home on the evening of October 15, 1941.[486] In discussing the relation of the European war to the Pacific, Admiral Turner said that the United States must prevent Hitler from gaining control over Europe because of the direct threat that German domination could eventually constitute to Central and South America. In order to stop German aggression, therefore, America had adopted the policy of strengthening Great Britain's natural resources, including those in the Far East.

In its negotiations with the Japanese government, the United States felt a certain trepidation because it doubted whether the present Japanese Cabinet had the support of the Japanese army. If an agreement were reached between the two countries under these circumstances, the United States wondered if the Japanese military faction, finding itself at variance with these negotiations, might overthrow the present Japanese Cabinet. Nevertheless, Admiral Turner pointed to the urgency of drawing up a formula on the basis of an equal compromise between Tokyo and Washington. According to Ambassador Nomura, Admiral Turner did not think that the Japanese were ready to compromise.[487]

To broach Japanese-American negotiations while doubting the ability of the Japanese Cabinet to carry out its promises was, in Mr. Terasaki's opinion, putting the cart before the horse. When mutual doubts were rife, he felt the United States should exercise greater statesmanship. Calling the United States' attitude toward the Far East and the China Incident idealistic, Mr. Terasaki remarked that the talk of principles was a hobby among the rich. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire After stating that the United States appeared determined to force Japan to fight with China until both countries were exhausted, Mr. Terasaki insisted that the China Incident was not an oversimplified question of principle, but was a matter of life or death to Japan. Because of sheer necessity, the Japanese had been forced to adopt an aggressive attitude toward China. Although he did not propose to go into the history of Panamanian-American relations at this time, Mr. Terasaki did compare his country's actions in China to the realistic policy adopted by the United States in its dealings with Central America.

If Admiral Turner were aware of the temperament of the Japanese people, Mr. Terasaki felt sure that he would realize that when cornered the Japanese would lose all interest in life and death and would fight back furiously. Although poorer materially than America, the Japanese government would fight to the finish in a Japanese-American war. On the other hand, if America extended its hand in friendship, Japan and the United States could become lasting friends instead of permanent enemies.[488]

[485] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 15, 1941, S.D., II, 686.
[486] III, 273.
[487] Ibid.
[488] III, 274.

[113]

126. Foreign Minister Toyoda Orders Further Welles-Wakasugi Conversations

Since Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that further conversations between Mr. Wakasugi and Under Secretary of State Welles might produce favorable results, on October 15, 1941 he requested the Japanese Minister to maintain close relations with the American Under Secretary of State.[489] During any further conversations, Mr. Wakasugi was instructed not to debate the United States' desire for establishing basic principles and Japan's insistence on clarifying outstanding differences, for if such arguments ensued during these conversations, Japan feared that the United States would insist on including the four basic principles in the text of any agreement.

Since these so-called basic principles were omitted from the preamble of the United States' proposals of June 21, 1941, Japan wished to take advantage of the American desire to use its June 21, 1941 proposals as a basis for definite negotiations, and thereby possibly continue the informal conversations without discussing the four basic principles independently.

According to Foreign Minister Toyoda, the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 had merely incorporated the Japanese proposals of September 16, 1941 into the American proposal of June 21, 1941. Since Japan did not feel that it should make any further concessions until America made another move, the Foreign Minister asked that Mr. Wakasugi discuss all the points of variance between the Japanese proposal and the American document of June 21, 1941 and report American intentions in these matters.

Because of the nature of these conversations, Japan further suggested that the matter be handled solely between Mr. Wakasugi and Under Secretary of State Welles. If sufficient progress were made, the matter could then be handled by Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull.[490]

127. Japanese Army Refuses To Evacuate Troops from China

In anticipation of Mr. Wakasugi's conference with Under Secretary of States Welles, scheduled for October 16, 1941, instructions had been received by the Japanese Military Attache in Washington from army headquarters in Tokyo, advising the Japanese representatives not to yield an inch in their stand on the need for Japanese troops in China.[491] Apparently, the Japanese army authorities in Tokyo believed that not enough stress had been laid upon the Japanese attitude toward the garrisoning of troops in Chinese territory. In the future, special emphasis was to be placed upon this question.[492]

Replying to these instructions, Ambassador Nomura stated that both he and Colonel Iwasa understood the aims of their government and had repeatedly informed American officials of the Japanese stand regarding this matter. Ambassador Nomura declared that during the conversation with Mr. Welles on October 13, 1941, Minister Wakasugi had deliberately avoided going deeply into the subject since the purpose of the conference had been merely to clarify certain points in the United States' proposals and ascertain America's intentions. However, Ambassador Nomura assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that Mr. Wakasugi would bring up the matter in his discussion with the American Under Secretary on the following day. Ambassador Nomura guaranteed that the importance of this question would not be minimized in an attempt to effect a compromise.[493]

[489] III, 275.
[490] Ibid.
[491] III, 276.
[492] Ibid.
[493] Ibid.

[114]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The reader will recall that Mr. Welles reported on October 13, 1941 that Mr. Wakasugi had twice emphasized the willingness of his government to evacuate eventually all Japanese troops from China.[494] It is not possible to discover what Mr. Wakasugi reported concerning this aspect of the conversation on October 13, 1941, since only part 4 of his six-part message to Tokyo is available.

128. Japan Reminds the United States of Its Obligations Under the Tripartite Pact

Though both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo had been urging Foreign Minister Toyoda to inform them confidentially concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, had declined to reveal the details of the conversation to the Axis representatives.[495]

Following German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent movement for revising the United States' Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese government inform President Roosevelt that further aggravation of America's relations with the Asiatic powers would inevitably result in a similar aggravation of diplomatic relations between Germany and Italy and the United States. This would provide reasons for Japan's assuming its obligations toward the Tripartite Pact, and, consequently, Japan might be forced to join the European war against the United States. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

In view of Japan's negotiations with the United States, Foreign Minister Toyoda had postponed the submission of the message suggested by Berlin because he believed that its proper timing and wording should be carefully considered. Meanwhile, the German authorities were continually requesting that the Japanese government make its views concerning the Tripartite Pact known to the United States.[496]

The official Japanese message stated that Japan had repeatedly affirmed that the aim of the Tripartite Pact was to prevent the further extension of the European war. As a signer of the Tripartite Pact, Japan sincerely desired that German-American relations would not deteriorate further and that the prevailing tension would be alleviated immediately.[497]

129. The Konoye Cabinet Resigns

On October 16, 1941 the Japanese Cabinet headed by Prince Konoye resigned. Two days later a new Cabinet was formed under General Hideki Tojo as Prime Minister with Shigenori Toga as Minister for Foreign Affairs. On October 17, 1941 (October 16, Washington time) Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura that the Cabinet had reached a decision to resign as a body because of the differences among the Cabinet members.[498] One of the main divergencies of opinion had resulted from the question of evacuating Japanese troops from China. Nevertheless, negotiations with the United States would be continued by the new Japanese Cabinet along the lines already formulated.

After thanking Ambassador Nomura and his entire staff for their previous efforts, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that they continue to work in unison and with a single purpose.[499]

[494] S.D., II, 685.
[495] III, 277.
[496] Ibid.
[497] III, 278.
[498] III, 279.
[499] Ibid.

[115]

130. Hull-Wakasugi-Welles Conversation (October 16 And October 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[500]

By prearrangement Under Secretary of State Welles brought Japanese Minister Wakasugi to confer with Secretary Hull on both October 16 and October 17, 1941. In spite of certain elaborations on the documents which had been exchanged by the two governments during previous informal conversations, no further clarification of any of the proposals was actually accomplished.

Mr. Wakasugi was especially vague about the differences arising from the stationing of Japanese troops in China, nondiscrimination in commerce, and the Japanese interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. By way of emphasizing those Japanese proposals which he felt restricted the application of the peace principles, Secretary Hull expressed the desire of the United States that the policy of commercial nondiscrimination, as well as the limitation of Japanese aggression, be applicable to the entire Pacific area.

Mr. Wakasugi attempted, without success, to explain to Secretary Hull that the Tripartite Pact was an instrument of peace and therefore not aimed at the United States. Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese Minister that since the Tripartite Pact had been openly designed to keep the United States out of war with Germany the American people could hardly be expected to regard it as a harmless document.

Since this issue could not be settled, Mr. Wakasugi discussed next the need for retaining Japanese troops in China. Secretary Hull reminded Minister Wakasugi that as a result of Japanese penetration Tokyo had obtained many monopolies in China which it was obviously unwilling to give up. If the friendship of China were to be acquired, Japan would have to curtail its aggressive policies. Phases affecting the Chinese situation in general which had already been discussed by Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull were again reviewed at this time.

In attempting to clarify the American requirements for a broad basic commercial policy in the Pacific, Secretary Hull pointed to the United States' trade agreement with Argentina which had been signed at Buenos Aires on October 14, 1941. Under this pact Japan and all other countries were given equal access to the markets of Argentina. In discussions with England and with the British Dominions, the United States was attempting to eliminate any imperial preferences and other discriminations including the narrow policy of bilateral trade.

Although Secretary Hull did not think the conversation with Mr. Wakasugi had produced any definite results, he felt that the Japanese representative had been given an opportunity to voice his country's opinions on certain matters. The Secretary of State believed that the Japanese government had fallen back from the stand it had once taken just before the occupation of French Indo-China, and that very little could be expected from future conversations.[501]

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report[502]

At 5:00 P.M. on October 16, 1941 Minister Wakasugi, Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles conferred on the Japanese diplomatic situation. Since the United States had apparently already received the news that Prime Minister Konoye's Cabinet was resigning, Secretary Hull was particularly anxious to make inquiries concerning the attitude of the new Japanese Cabinet toward negotiations with America.

[500] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", October 16 and 17, 1941, S.D., II, 687-689.
[501] Ibid.
[502] III, 280.

[116]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Since no detailed news had reached the Japanese Embassy in Washington, Minister Wakasugi was forced to base his remarks on the public announcement made in regard to the Cabinet's resignation. However, he pointed out that, regardless of the type of Cabinet now installed, Japanese-American relations must take a definite stand. In the face of American opposition the Japanese people could not continue on a policy of indecision; public opinion demanded that the Japanese government take a definite stand, whether to the right or to the left.

If no unanimous decision could be reached between the two nations, particularly in regard to the China Incident, Mr. Wakasugi feared for the future. Therefore, the Japanese Minister was most anxious to discover some points of agreement between the American proposal of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941.[503]

After recounting the substance of former conversations for half an hour, Secretary Hull insisted that the United States had no intention of following a policy of procrastination. But although anxious to establish peaceful and normal political relations with Japan, the United States could not stand by and approve any attempts of the Japanese to set up a new regime in the Far East similar to the new order established in Europe by Adolf Hitler.

Because of the United States' determination to base its actions upon the policy of nondiscrimination and freedom of the seas, it was opposed to all militaristic policies. Therefore, the United States found it difficult to understand Japan's professed desire to maintain peace while carrying on a military invasion at the same time. In view of the many military expansionists among influential Japanese people, Secretary Hull doubted if it were possible for the Japanese government to cooperate in peaceful measures.

In reply, Mr. Wakasugi agreed that a certain faction in Japan advocated expansion to the north or south. However, the Japanese representative insisted that only because of economic pressure, applied by foreign nations, had Japan been forced to become aggressive in order to maintain its national security and guarantee the very existence of its people. The mere desire for self-preservation demanded that Japan secure necessary materials.[504] Unless the United States attempted to understand Japan's position and exhibited a friendly attitude by lifting the economic restrictions placed upon Japan, the Japanese government would be forced to continue its military moves and the situation would grow continually worse.

In order to make his previous statements clearer to Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Welles urged Secretary Hull to comment further on the American objectives. Secretary Hull then reiterated that the United States' present actions were motivated by the desire to defeat Hitlerism, abolish all militarism and, finally, bring about an equality of opportunity throughout China and the entire Pacific area. By his remarks, Secretary Hull exhibited full understanding of Japan's position with respect to the Tripartite Pact. However, he declined to discuss fully the problem of establishing peace between Japan and China because he advocated non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations.

Mr. Hull suggested, instead, that Mr. Wakasugi discuss the Chinese problem directly with Chinese officials. In view of the present situation, however, Mr. Wakasugi did not feel free to discuss the problem with either Ambassador Hu Shih or Mr. Soong Tse-Wen, with whom he was well acquainted.[505]

Continuing the discussion of the Chinese problem, Mr. Wakasugi emphasized the difficulty of evacuating Japanese troops from China because of the dangerous activities of Communist

[503] Ibid.
[504] III, 281.
[505] III, 282.

[117]

forces in the north. Believing it necessary to keep a certain number of Japanese troops stationed in China indefinitely, and describing the Communists as a "cancerous growth on the development of China", Mr. Wakasugi explained that in order to protect the lives, property and commercial interests of both Japanese and foreigners, troops must be garrisoned there. Furthermore, since the Chinese were most interested in the safety of their lives and their livelihood, the retention of Japanese troops served this purpose.

Apparently, misinformation had led President Roosevelt to think that the Chinese Communist Party was engaged merely in educational activities. Actually, the Communist faction was attempting to destroy Chinese society and industry at the very roots. Therefore, the Chinese did not care in whose hands the maintenance of peace remained as long as the lives of the Chinese people were protected. To these remarks Secretary Hull countered that the United States had already found it more profitable to practice the "Good Neighbor Policy" than to garrison troops in another country. However, anxious to end the discussion of this matter, Secretary Hull again suggested that the problem be taken up by the Japanese and Chinese representatives.

Secretary Hull apparently had no desire to discuss any other problems outside of the three already mentioned. Under Secretary of State Welles then explained to Secretary Hull the desire of Minister Wakasugi to discuss both the differences and the points of mutual agreement in the Japanese proposals. To accomplish this end, Secretary Hull suggested that the officials concerned meet and work out the details. But reminding the American Secretary of State of the unproductive meetings held previously by American and Japanese officials, Mr. Wakasugi insisted that the situation did not permit further procrastination. Therefore, at this time the Japanese government wished to confine its discussions to important questions only.[506]

131. Prince Konoye Bids Farewell to Ambassador Grew (October 17, 1941)

Mr. Ushiba, Prince Konoye's private secretary, called at Mr. Dooman's home early on the morning of October 17, 1941 with a private letter from Prince Konoye to Ambassador Grew.[507]

Expressing regret in his message to Mr. Grew for the internal political situation in Japan which had led to his resignation, at the same time Prince Konoye assured the American Ambassador that the new Cabinet would exert every effort to conclude successfully a rapprochement between the two countries. Furthermore, the retiring Japanese Prime Minister promised his own personal assistance to the incoming Japanese government.[508]

After Mr. Dooman had read the message, Mr. Ushiba made an oral statement pertaining largely to the status of the new Japanese government. Because Secretary Hull's memorandum of October 2, 1941 had been so great a disappointment to the Konoye Cabinet, it had been felt that the present conversations could never be concluded successfully. In view, then, of the internal situation in Japan, Prince Konoye had decided to resign.

Although it seemed at first inevitable that the next Cabinet would consist largely of Japanese extremists, Prince Konoye through intensive efforts had succeeded in obtaining a Cabinet which desired to continue the conversations with the United States. However, since no civilian statesman could expect the cooperation of Japanese militarists, the new Japanese Prime Minister was necessarily an army officer and the Cabinet was composed principally of military men.

[506] III, 283
[507] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 17, 1941, S.D., II 689-691.
[508] "The retiring Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 16, 1941, S.D., II, 691-692.

[118]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

While out of the government, Prince Konoye still intended to direct his influence toward the achievement of Japanese-American friendship. Mr. Dooman then expressed his regret that Prince Konoye had felt it necessary to resign while the conversations were still in progress at Washington.

When the discussion turned to Japanese leadership, Mr. Dooman mentioned Prince Yamagata as a man capable of unifying Japan's army. Agreeing with this, Mr. Ushiba also believed that General Umedzu, Chief of the Kwantung Army, unlike General Sugiyama, would be able to exert great influence when the need for it arose.[509]

In answer to Prince Konoye's personal letter, Ambassador Grew offered his appreciation for the retiring Prime Minister's assurances regarding the aims of the new Japanese Cabinet.[510] After thanking Prince Konoye for his desire to cooperate with the new Japanese government, Ambassador Grew promised to continue his own efforts toward attaining a successful conclusion of the conversations between Japan and the United States.[511]

132. Hull-Wakasugi-Welles Conversation (October 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

Secretary Hull did not write a separate report of this conversation with Minister Wakasugi, but instead summarized the conversations of October 16 and October 17, 1941 in one report.[512]

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

In keeping with his instructions from Prince Konoye's Cabinet, Mr. Wakasugi conversed with Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State Welles on October 17, 1941. Although neither side was to be committed officially by the remarks made during this conversation, in view of the fact that the Japanese Embassy in Washington had not yet received instructions from the new Cabinet, Mr. Wakasugi did not wish to delay a discussion of the three points involved in the Japanese-American negotiations.

After agreeing that the conversation was entirely off-the-record, Secretary Hull inquired concerning the outstanding points in the Japanese and American proposals. Mr. Wakasugi read those paragraphs from the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941 and the United States' proposal of June 21, 1941 pertaining to the definition of self-defense under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since the Japanese proposals had made the right of self-defense a mutual one, Mr. Wakasugi did not think there should be any problem involved.

Pointing to the persistent rumors in Japan that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact had been to prevent the United States from entering the war, Mr. Hull remarked that if the United States, which had no intention of military aggression against any nation, should be forced to enter the European war in self-defense, the resulting action of the Japanese government would be of grave concern. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Mr. Wakasugi replied that the "interpretation of the right of self-defense" was governed by the intentions of the country invoking its use. Therefore, Japan would refrain from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact depending upon the intentions of the United States government. In line with this reasoning the Japanese government felt that it was obvious that its actions stemmed from its desire for self-preservation and that the application of any phrase in its proposal would be based on this desire. By the term "self-preservation" Japan implied that it alone would determine the means of ensuring self-preservation independently of any

[509] S.D., II, 689-691.
[510] "The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the retiring Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye)", October 17, 1941, S.D., II, 692.
[511] Ibid.
[512] See S.D., II, 687-689.

[119]

foreign country whether it be Great Britain, the United States or Germany; consequently, from the Japanese viewpoint no other implications or interpretations could be given to either the phrase "self-defense" or "self-preservation".

In Mr. Terasaki's opinion, it was a self-evident fact that a political agreement could not limit the signers to political commitments against a third country. In view of the Imperial Rescript published when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, it was obvious that in Japan's opinion the agreement's real mission was a contribution to world peace and not an aid to aggression and aggrandizement.

Although he listened carefully to Mr. Wakasugi's detailed explanation, Secretary Hull apparently suspected that the Tripartite Pact could be interpreted to suit the needs or aims of any Japanese Cabinet in power at the time. Aware of Secretary Hull's fears, Mr. Wakasugi remarked that when viewed through the eyes of suspicion, even the so-called defensive measures of the United States were questionable. In concluding the discussion of this point, both the American and Japanese representatives agreed that careful study of the problem should continue.

Because Secretary Hull was mainly interested in commercial nondiscrimination, the conversation then turned to that problem. Since the assumption of his post many years ago, Secretary Hull had taken great pride in the materialization of the nondiscriminatory policy in trade matters. Particularly proud of the recently signed trade agreement with Argentina and the prevention of the self-interested British appeasement policy in Central and South America, Secretary Hull was certain of the success of such a program in the Pacific. However, unless the principle was applied to the entire Pacific, including China, the contribution it would make toward peace would be negligible.

It was Secretary Hull's sincere belief that world peace could be more easily attained through the adjustment of trade relations than through the settlement of political problems. Because of Japan's geographical position, its race and business ability, Japan would undoubtedly receive concrete and positive advantages from the adoption and application of this basic policy in the Far East.

Admitting that these principles were theoretically advantageous, Mr. Wakasugi stated that each individual nation must apply them in different ways in order to survive. The United States continued to measure the requirements of other countries by its own resources, despite the fact that the position of lesser countries differed greatly from that of the United States. Occupying only a very small corner of the Far East and engrossed for four years with the China Incident, Japan was forced to cope with a number of circumstances peculiar to itself.

For obvious and unavoidable reasons Japan had established various systems in China in order to cope with the temporary conditions of occupation. Therefore, even if Japan agreed to comply with the basic principles advanced by the United States, from a practical and actual standpoint it would be impossible to put them into effect overnight. Although Japan desired to apply the United States' principles at the conclusion of the war, it was not in the realm of practicality even to attempt such an application when the whole world was in a chaotic condition.

Mr. Wakasugi suggested, therefore, that the two countries discuss matters which Japan was capable of carrying out at the present time. The actual problems should be worked out as much as possible in order that joint and cooperative action could be taken at the first opportunity.

Although recognizing Japan's internal position and circumstances, Secretary Hull commented upon the United States' own domestic conditions. American businessmen in China, whose interest had been curtailed because of the monopolistic attitude of Japan in Chinese trade, were voicing complaints which the United States could not neglect. Returning again to a discussion of fundamental issues, Secretary Hull then asked that Japan accept the United States' basic principles.

[120]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In reply to a question from Secretary Hull, Mr. Wakasugi discussed conditions in Japan. Because of the general public opinion in Japan, Mr. Wakasugi explained that the Japanese government was forced to take immediate and decisive action either to the right or left. Nevertheless, because of the sensitiveness of the Japanese people, even the slightest gesture on the part of the United States toward accepting an understanding would immediately relieve the existing tension. If even minor matters were settled, the situation would improve; then, as time went on an agreement could be reached on the more weighty items.

With this goal in mind, Mr. Wakasugi suggested that the United States release the Itukusima Maru and the Syoyo Maru, which were anchored at San Francisco because the money to pay for fuel had been frozen. Under Secretary of State Welles took down the names of these vessels and other pertinent facts and promised to take the matter up with the bureaus concerned.[513]

[513] III, 284.

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OUTLINE OF PART B*

Japanese Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages

(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from the Panama Canal
(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa
(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia

PART B—JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES

Continuing to use diplomatic channels for the transmission of intelligence concerning American merchant ships and men-of-war during the period from August 16, 1941 to October 17, 1941, Japanese officials in Tokyo received an increasing number of such dispatches from the United States and South America, the Philippines and Hawaiian Islands.

(a) Reports from the United States

133. Japan Learns that American Oil Is Being Transported to Russia

Consul Kenji Nakauchi in Hollywood, California reported on August 16, 1941 that the St. Claire, after loading 95,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, had sailed from Los Angeles for Vladivostok, and was scheduled to rendezvous at some point in the Pacific with the Fitzsimmons and three other American vessels, all carrying similar cargo. According to rumor, a number of United States destroyers on maneuvers were also bound for Vladivostok,[514] and a Japanese spy in Seattle reported that the English warship, Warspite, had entered the port of Bremerton about August 13 or 14, 1941.[515]

It was disclosed on August 21, 1941 that the Russian ship, Vladimar Mayskovsky, had arrived at Seattle, and after being repaired, would move to California to load freight for Vladivostok. The Minsk was reported to have left Seattle harbor, although its destination was unknown, and the Patrovsuky was still in dry dock.[516]

On the same day Tokyo informed Berlin that though America was apparently transporting oil to Russia, using American, Russian, and neutral ships, and there was a possibility that several hundred planes had already been transported, up to the present time not one American vessel had entered the port of Vladivostok. Although both the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo and the American government, through Ambassador Nomura, had been warned by Japan concerning the extension of a third power's military movements to East Asia, Japan believed that it was impossible to effect any actual restraint through such steps.[517]

*See TABLE OF CONTENTS for a detailed listing of topics discussed in Part B.

[514] III, 285.
[515] III, 286.
[516] III, 287.
[517] III, 288.

lava 3.lav.92 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Synopsis

Jimbo takes the boys on a hunting trip on a mountain. Stan's father, a geologist, discovers that the mountain is going to erupt. The whole town pulls together to save the hunters and South Park itself. Meanwhile, the party on the mountain is unaware of the danger. Their greatest concern is Scuzzlebutt, a monster with celery for a hand, Patrick Duffy for a leg, and spends his free time weaving baskets.
Full Recap

The boys are off on a hunting trip with Stan's Uncle Jimbo and Jimbo has brought along his old war buddy Ned. Uncle Jimbo and Ned plan to teach the boys some of the basic rules of hunting, such as "not spilling your beer in the bullet chamber." They go to the woods outside of town and the boys are each issued a beer, smokes, and a gun. Uncle Jimbo also teaches them about the technicalities of hunting, such as how to shoot at endangered species, legally. Cartman gets into hunting, but Stan has an issue with shooting the bunny, disappointing his Uncle Jimbo; but Stan doesn't appear to have a problem with his desire to shoot Cartman. Meanwhile, in the background, the mountain located just outside of town has started rumbling. Randy Marsh is informed that the mountain is a volcano.
Back at hunting camp, Ned uses the old Indian fire trick to get the campfire going. The gasoline he uses catches himself and Jimbo's Hummer on fire. The Hummer explodes, trapping them in the woods. At City Hall, Chef is lobbying for Salisbury steak, when Randy Marsh enters warning the mayor about the pending eruption of Mt. Evanson and the town is "totally screwed." Chef informs the mayor that the children are up in the mountains camping; so the mayor mobilizes the media and the citizens to save South Park and the children. Back at the camp, scary stories are being told around the campfire. Cartman tries to scare the others with the story of "Skuzzle-butt," a monster with a hand of celery, leg of Patrick Duffy and a penchant for weaving wicker baskets. Of course, they don't believe him. Ned starts singing around the campfire, as Cartman disguises himself as "Skuzzle-butt" to scare them the next day. Kenny is taken fishing the following morning as he has won the favor of Jimbo, much to Stan's dismay. Stan reports to his uncle that Cartman is missing, so the fishing trip is shortened so that they can go look for him.
The media has arrived in South Park. In their search for Cartman, the hunters come upon "Skuzzle-butt," who is really Cartman in disguise. Cartman is convinced he has them scared, until they start shooting at him. The mayor plans to start breaking people up into search parties, when Randy Marsh shows her his plan for diverting the volcano's lava around the town. Some of the townspeople are given the task of digging a large trench. On the search for "Skuzzle-butt" Stan takes the lead in the hunt, while Cartman tries to get out of his disguise. The citizens prepare to for the eventual eruption of the volcano by watching the old film "Duck and Cover," which Chef cites as a load of crap. Meanwhile, back in the woods, Stan has "Skuzzle-butt" in his sights.
Stan finds he still can't shoot at any living thing, Uncle Jimbo is about to take care of the job himself, when Cartman finally gets his disguise off. The volcano erupts, and is almost killed by the hot lava. The hunting party finds their escape from the woods cut-off by the trench the townspeople have dug to divert the lava. The real "Skuzzle-butt" appears and saves the day by weaving a wicker basket that he uses to get them across the trench. The trench itself also works by diverting the lava into a nearby canyon that goes to Denver. Everyone, including Kenny appears to be safe. Chef sings a song to celebrate and the mayor thanks "Skuzzle-butt." Stan also gives thanks to "Skuzzle-butt" in the form of a shot to the head. Stan doesn't understand why his uncle is disappointed now that he has actually shot something. Deciding that hunting is "stupid" the boys go home to watch cartoons, because as Cartman says "cartoons kick ass."
Kenny dies when Ned drops his gun and it goes off, despite previously being torched by hot lava.